martes, 3 de marzo de 2009

La Nicaragua de Daniel

Weekend Edition
February 27 - March 1, 2009
Et Tu, Daniel?

The Betrayal of the Sandinista Revolution


Upon his inauguration as Nicaraguan president in January 2007, Daniel Ortega asserted that his government would represent “the second stage of the Sandinista Revolution.” His election was full of symbolic resonance, coming after 16 years of electoral failures for Ortega and the party he led, the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN). The Sandinistas’ road to power was paved with a series of previously unthinkable pacts with the old somocista and Contra opposition. The FSLN’s pact making began in earnest in 2001, when, in the run-up to that year’s presidential election, Ortega forged an alliance with Arnoldo Alemán, an official during the Somoza regime who had been elected president in 1997.

But even with Alemán’s backing, Ortega was unable to win the presidency. So, before the 2006 election, he publicly reconciled with his old nemesis, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, a potent symbol of the counterrevolutionary movement in the 1980s. Ortega and his longtime companion, Rosario Murillo, announced their conversion to Catholicism and were married by the cardinal. Just before his election Ortega supported a comprehensive ban on abortion, including in cases in which the mother’s life is endangered, a measure ratified by the legislature with the crucial votes of Sandinista deputies. To round out his pre-election wheeling and dealing, Ortega selected Jaime Morales, a former Contra leader, as his vice presidential candidate.

Even with these concessions to the right, Ortega won the presidency with just 37.9% of the votes. Once in power, he announced a series of policies and programs that seemed to hark back to the Sandinista years. Educational matriculation fees were abolished, an illiteracy program was launched with Cuban assistance, and an innovative Zero Hunger program established, financed from the public budget and Venezuelan aid, that distributed one cow, one pig, 10 hens, and a rooster, along with seeds, to 15,000 families during the first year. Internationally, Nicaragua joined the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), a trade and economic cooperation pact that includes Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela.

But the Ortega government’s clientelistic and sectarian nature soon became evident when Ortega, by presidential decree, established Councils of Citizen Power under the control of the Sandinista party to administer and distribute much of the social spending. Even more importantly, under the rubric of ALBA, Ortega signed an accord with Venezuela that provides an estimated $300 million to $500 million in funds personally administered by Ortega with no public accountability.

As Mónica Baltodano, the leader of Resacte, a dissident Sandinista organization, argued in a recent article, Ortega’s fiscal and economic policies are, in fact, continuous with those of the previous governments, despite his anti-imperialist rhetoric and denunciations of neoliberalism.1 The government has signed new accords with the International Monetary Fund that do not modify the neoliberal paradigm, while the salaries of government workers remain frozen and those of teachers and health workers are the lowest in Central America. According to the Central Bank of Nicaragua, the average salary has dropped the last two years, retrogressing to 2001 levels.2

Moreover, the government and the Sandinista party are harassing and repressing their opponents. During an interview in January, Baltodano told me the right to assembly has been systematically violated during the past year, as opposition demonstrations are put down with goon squads. “Ortega is establishing an authoritarian regime, sectarian, corrupt, and repressive, to maintain his grip on power, betraying the legacy of the Sandinista revolution,” she said.


The core of this legacy was the revolution’s commitment to popular democracy. Seizing power in 1979 from the dictator Anastasio Somoza, the Sandinista movement comprised Nicaragua’s urban masses, peasants, artisans, workers, Christian base communities, intellectuals, and the muchachos—the youth who spearheaded the armed uprisings. The revolution transformed social relations and values, holding up a new vision of society based on social and economic justice that included the poor and dispossessed. The revolution was muticlass, multiethnic, multidoctrinal, and politically pluralistic.

While socialism was part of the public discourse, it was never proclaimed to be an objective of the revolution. It was officially designated “a popular, democratic, and anti-imperialist revolution.” Radicalized social democrats, priests, and political independents as well as Marxists and Marxist-Leninists served as cabinet ministers of the Sandinista government. Images of Sandino, Marx, Christ, Lenin, Bolívar, and Carlos Fonseca, the martyred founder of the Sandinista movement, often hung side by side in the cities and towns of Nicaragua.

A central attribute of the revolution that has made its legacy so powerful is that it was a revolución compartida, a revolution shared with the rest of the world.3 As Nicaragua, a country with fewer than 3 million inhabitants, defied the wrath of the U.S. imperium, people from around the world rallied to the revolution’s support. In a manner reminiscent of the Spanish civil war half a century earlier, the Sandinista revolution came to be seen as a new political utopia, rupturing national frontiers. It marked a generation of activists around the globe who found in the revolution a reason to hope and believe.

With the deepening of the U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary war from military bases in Honduras, activists from the United States came to be the largest contingent to support the Sandinista revolution. An estimated 100,000 people from the United States visited Nicaragua in the 1980s, many as simple political tourists. Some came as part of delegations, but most of them arrived on their own. It was an experience totally different from that of Cuba, where the prohibition of U.S. travel to the island meant that only organized delegations arrived via Mexico or Canada with assigned accommodations and structured tours. But it was not just the travel arrangements that were different. Those going to Nicaragua found an “open door” society: They could talk with anyone, travel to the countryside, and stay where they pleased with no interference from the government.

The Sandinista revolution’s commitment to democracy led it down a new political path. This was not a revolutionary government conducted, in the classical sense, by a dictatorship of the proletariat. While the National Directorate of the FSLN oversaw the revolutionary process, it was not dictated by a single strongman but by nine people who reached consensus decisions with input from popular organizations. The Nicaraguan Revolution thus responded to internal and external challenges by deepening its democratic and participatory content, rather than by declaring a dictatorship.

In October 1983, when a U.S. assault appeared imminent in the aftermath of the invasion of Grenada, the National Directorate adopted the slogan “All Arms to the People” and distributed more than 200,000 weapons to the militias and popular organizations. I was there as U.S. aircraft flew over Managua, breaking the sound barrier, trying to “shock and awe” the populace. Bomb shelters and defensive trenches were hastily built as the country mobilized for war.

We may never know whether the threatened invasion was a ruse or if the popular mobilization forestalled a U.S. attack. But it did reaffirm the revolution’s commitment to democracy. In 1984, in the midst a deteriorating economy and the escalating Contra war, the country held an election in which seven candidates vied for the presidency. The election was monitored by “at least 460 accredited observers from 24 countries,” who unanimously described it as fair.4 A reported 83% of the electorate participated, and Ortega won with almost 67% of the votes.5 The election demonstrated that a revolutionary government can solidify its hold on power in the midst of conflict, not by adopting increasingly dictatorial powers but by building mass democratic support.

The adoption of a new constitution in 1986 marked yet another step forward in the democratic process. The constitution, which established separation of powers, directly incorporated human rights declarations, and abolished the death penalty, among other measures, was drafted by constituent assembly members elected in 1984 and submitted to the country for discussion.6 To facilitate these debates, 73 cabildos abiertos, or town meetings, were attended by an estimated 100,000 Nicaraguans around the country. At these meetings, about 2,500 Nicaraguans made suggestions for changes in the constitution.

But this bold Sandinista experiment in revolutionary democracy was not destined to persevere. As occurred in the Spanish civil war, the tide of history ran against the heroic people of Nicaragua, sapping their will in the late 1980s as the Contra war waged on and the economy unraveled. Often as I departed from the San Francisco airport on yet another flight to the Central American isthmus, I would look down on the Bay Area, with its population roughly the same size as Nicaragua’s and an economy many times larger, and wonder how the Sandinista revolution could possibly survive a war with the most powerful nation on earth.

Perhaps the die was cast in neighboring El Salvador with the failure of the guerrillas there to seize power as the United States mounted a counterinsurgency war. The inability to advance the revolution in Central America seemed to confirm Leon Trotsky’s belief that a revolution cannot survive and mature in just one nation—especially in small countries like Nicaragua with porous borders, which, unlike island Cuba, lend themselves to infiltration and repeated forays from well-provisioned military bases.

To end the debilitating war, the Sandinista leaders turned to peace negotiations. Placing their faith in democracy, they signed an accord that called for a ceasefire and elections to be held in February 1990, in which the Contras as well as the internal opposition would be allowed to participate. Once again the popular organizations mobilized for the campaign, and virtually all the polls indicated that Ortega would win a second term as president, defeating the Contra-backed candidate, Violeta Chamorro, whose campaign received generous funding from the United States.

Nicaraguans and much of the world were shocked when Chamorro defeated Ortega with 55% of the vote. Even people who were sympathetic to the Sandinistas voted for the opposition because they wanted the war to end, as the threat of more U.S.-backed violence remained looming. The day after the election, a woman vendor passed me by sobbing. I asked her what was wrong, and she said, “Daniel will no longer be my president.” After exchanging a few more words, I asked whom she had voted for. “Violeta,” she said, “because I want my son in the Sandinista army to come home alive.”


During the next 16 years, three Nicaraguan presidents backed by the United States implemented a series of neoliberal policies, gutting the social and economic policies of the Sandinista era and impoverishing the country. Ortega ran in every election, drifting increasingly to the right, while exerting an iron hand to stifle all challengers and dissenters in the Sandinista party. Surprisingly, Orlando Nuñez, with whom I wrote a book with on the revolution’s democratic thrust, remained loyal to Ortega while most of the middle-level cadre and the National Directorate abandoned the party.7 Many of these split off to form the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS), the largest dissident Sandinista party, founded in 1995.

When I asked Nuñez about his stance, he argued that only the Sandinista party has a mass base. “Dissident Sandinistas and their organizations,” he said, “cannot recruit the poor, the peasants, the workers, nor mount a significant electoral challenge.” Nuñez, who works as an adviser on social affairs to the president’s office, went on to argue that Ortega allied with Alemán not out of political cynicism, but for the sake of building an anti-oligarchic front. According to this theory, Alemán and the somocistas represent an emergent capitalist class that took on the old oligarchy, which had dominated Nicaraguan politics and the economy since the 19th century.8 A major thrust of Ortega’s rhetoric is bent on attacking the oligarchy, which is clustered in the opposition Conservative Party.

But it is also true that some of the most famous Sandinistas, many of whom are in the dissident camp today—like Ernesto Cardenal, Gioconda Belli, Carlos Fernando Chamorro, and others—are descendents of oligarchic families. Accordingly, Ortega and Murillo have accused them of being in league with conservatives in an effort to reimpose the old order on Nicaragua. While the dissident Sandinistas have yet to mount a significant electoral challenge, the Ortega administration has nonetheless gone after them with a particular vehemence. Case in point: Chamorro, the onetime director of the Sandinista party newspaper, Barricada. In June 2007, Chamorro aired an investigative report on Esta Semana, the popular news show he hosts. According to the report, which included tape-recorded conversations, FSLN functionaries tried to extort $4 million from Armel González, a partner in a tourist development project called Arenas Bay, in exchange for a swift end to the project’s legal woes, which included challenges from campesino cooperatives over land disputes.

The government’s response to the bad publicity was swift and ruthless. While the district attorney buried the case, González was charged and convicted of slander. National Assembly deputy Alejandro Bolaños, who backed the denunciation, was arbitrarily removed from his legislative seat. And Chamorro was denounced in the Sandinista-controlled media as a “delinquent,” a “narco-trafficker,” and a “robber of peasant lands.”

The harassment of Chamorro and other government critics continued during the run-up to Nicaragua’s November 2008 municipal elections, which were widely viewed as a referendum on the Ortega administration. The Ministry of Government launched a probe into NGOs operating in the country, accusing the Center for Communications Research (Cinco), which is headed by Chamorro, of “diverting and laundering money” through its agreement with the Autonomous Women’s Movement (MAM), which opposes the Ortega-endorsed law banning abortion. This agreement, financed by eight European governments and administered by Oxfam, aims to promote “the full citizenship of women.” First lady Murillo called it “Satan’s fund” and “the money of evil.”

Cinco’s board of directors were interrogated, and a prosecutor accompanied by the police raided the Cinco offices with a search warrant. Warned in advance of the visit, some 200 people gathered in the building in solidarity, refusing the police entry. Then as night fell, the police established a cordon around the building and, in the early morning, police broke down the door. After kicking out the protesters, the police stayed in the office for 15 hours, with supporters and onlookers gathered outside, shutting down traffic for blocks around. The police rummaged through offices, carting off files and computers. Since then, no formal charges have been filed, but Chamorro remains under official investigation.

Along with MAM, the broader women’s movement in Nicaragua, which firmly opposes the Ortega government, was among the first to experience its repressive blows. In 2007 the government opened a case against nine women leaders, accusing them of conspiring “to cover up the crime of rape in the case of a 9-year-old rape victim known as ‘Rosita,’ who obtained an abortion in Nicaragua in 2003.”9 In August, Ortega was unable to attend the inauguration of Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo because of protests by the country’s feminist organizations; from then on, women’s mobilizations have occurred in other countries Ortega has visited, including Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Peru.10

Charges were levied against other former Sandinistas who dared to speak out against the Ortega government, including 84-year-old Catholic priest Ernesto Cardenal, the renowned poet who once served as minister of culture. In August, after Cardenal criticized Ortega at Lugo’s inauguration, a judge revived an old, previously dismissed case involving a German citizen who sued Cardenal in 2005 for insulting him.11

In addition to harassing critics, the Ortega government also displayed its penchant for electoral fraud during the run-up to the November municipal balloting. Protests erupted in June, after the Ortega-stacked Supreme Electoral Council disqualified the MRS and the Conservative Party from participation. Dora Maria Tellez, a leader of the renovation movement, began a public hunger strike that led to daily demonstrations of support, often shutting down traffic in downtown Managua.

Meanwhile, bands of young Sandinista-linked thugs, claiming to be the “owners of the streets,” attacked demonstrators while the police stood idly by. Then, to prevent more demonstrations, Ortega supporters set up plantones, permanent occupation posts at the rotundas on the main thoroughfare running through Managua. Those who camped out there were known as rezadores, or people praying to God that Ortega be protected and his opponents punished.

Besides the FSLN, two major political parties remained on the ballot, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance. While independent surveys indicated that the opposition candidates would win the majority of the seats, the Supreme Electoral Council, which had prohibited international observers, ruled that the Sandinista candidates won control of 105 municipalities, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party won 37, and the Alliance won the remaining six. An independent Nicaraguan group, Ethics and Transparency, organized tens of thousands of observers but was denied accreditation, forcing them to observe the election from outside polling stations. But the group estimates that irregularities took place at a third of the polling places. Their complaints were echoed by Nicaraguan Catholic bishops, including Managua’s archbishop, who said, “People feel defrauded.”12

After the election, militant demonstrations erupted in Nicaragua’s two largest cities, Managua and León, and were quickly put down with violence. The European Economic Community and the U.S. government suspended funding for Nicaragua over the fraudulent elections. On January 14, before the election results were even officially published by the electoral council, Ortega swore in the new mayors at Managua’s Plaza de la Revolución. He declared: “This is the time to strengthen our institutions,” later adding, “We cannot go back to the road of war, to confrontation, to violence.” Along with the regular police, Ortega stood flanked by camisas rosadas, or redshirts, members of his personal security force. A huge banner hung over the plaza depicting Ortega with an up-stretched arm and the slogan, “To Be With the People Is to Be With God.”

“This despotic regime is bent on destroying all that is left of the Sandinista revolution’s democratic legacy,” Chamorro told me in January. “Standing in the way of a new dictatorship,” he continued, “are civil society organizations, the independent media, trade unions, opposition political parties, women’s organizations, civic leaders and others—many of whom can trace their roots back to the resistance against Somoza.”

As the Nobel-winning novelist José Saramago put it: “Once more a revolution has been betrayed from within.” Nicaragua’s revolution has indeed been betrayed, perhaps not as dramatically as Trotsky depicted Stalin’s desecration of what was best in the Bolshevik revolution. But Ortega’s betrayal is a fundamental political tragedy for everyone around the world who came to believe in a popular, participatory democracy in Nicaragua.

Roger Burbach directs the Center for the Study of the Americas (CENSA), based in Berkeley, California ( He was a “fellow traveler” during the Sandinista revolutionary years, collaborating with the FSLN Directorate of International Relations in analyzing U.S. political and military strategies.


1. Mónica Baltodano, “El ‘nuevo sandinismo’ es de la izquierda? Democracia pactada en Nicaragua,” Le Monde diplomatique, Southern Cone edition (December 2008): 16–17.

2. Ibid.

3. The concept of revolución compartida is developed in Sergio Ramírez, Adios muchachos: una memoría de la revolución sandinista (Mexico City: Aguilar, 1999).

4. Rosa Marina Zelaya, “International Election Observers: Nicaragua Under a Microscope,” Envío 103 (February 1990),

5. BBC, “1984: Sandinistas Claim Election Victory,” available at

6. Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost, Democracy and Socialism in Sandinista Nicaragua (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 84–85.

7. Roger Burbach and Orlando Nuñez, Fire in the Americas, Forging a Revolutionary Agenda (Verso, 1987).

8. Nuñez develops this argument in his book La Oligarquia en Nicaragua (Managua: Talleres de Grafitex, 2006). See also Nuñez, “La Agonía política de la oligarquia,” El 19 no. 14, November 27–December 3, 2008, available at

9. Human Rights Watch, “Nicaragua: Protect Rights Advocates from Harassment and Intimidation,” October 28, 2008, available at

10. Baltodano, “El ‘nuevo sandinismo’ es de la izquierda?”

11. CBC News, “Latin American Artists Protest Persecution of Nicaraguan Poet,” September 6, 2008, available at

12. “How to Steal an Election,” The Economist, November 13, 2008.

*This article appears in the NACLA Report on the Americas, “Revolutionary Legacies in the 21st Century,” March/April, 2009. See the full Report for additional articles on Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia and Haiti.

1 comentario:

Anónimo dijo...

Diga lo que diga la falsa izquierda de las ONGs derechistas financiadas por el imperio, la realidad imposible de ocultar es que el obispo Fernando Lugo ganó las elecciones del 20 de abril con notorio respaldo de la embajada norteamericana ocupada por James Cason, y con el apoyo de la prensa vinculada a la Secta Moon. Su plataforma política la constituyeron grupos de activistas vinculados a ONGs derechistas relacionadas con el NED, IAF, USAID, etc., neoliberales como el sector de Luis Alberto Castiglioni y los partidarios del desaparecido dictador Alfredo Stroessner, todos ellos disidentes del partido colorado que presentó una candidatura que no era del agrado de estos grupos de extrema derecha.

Algunos grupos que se autoproclaman izquierdistas alegaron razones de coyuntura para seguir como furgón de cola la candidatura del obispo. La presencia de ellos constituye parte del libreto de la derecha, que los utiliza para fustigar sobre supuesta infiltración marxista en el gabinete del clérigo, aunque en realidad esté constituído en su totalidad por personeros del neoliberalismo y la embajada norteamericana.


La totalidad los integrantes del gabinete del obispo Fernando Lugo provienen del sector de las ONGs financiadas por la embajada norteamericana. Se cuentan entre ellos a Gloria Rubín (referente en Paraguay del NED y la CIA), Camilo Soares (beneficiario de fondos de IAF y NED, favorecido del gobierno de George W. Bush) Rafael Filizzola (signatario de acuerdos con Alvaro Uribe a instancias de la ex operadora del plan Colombia Liliana Ayalde), Karina Rodríguez (de la Casa de la Juventud, que recibió 127 mil dólares de la Inter American Foundation), Liz Torres (referente de las logias de ONGs dependientes de la embajada norteamericana), Esperanza Martínez (del movimiento Tekojojá, financiado por USAID, hoy envuelto en escándalo por corrupción), Canciller Hamed Franco (del Pmas, un movimiento financiado por James Cason), el Vice-canciller Jorge Lara Castro (recibe dólares de la embajada a través de la ONG fantasma Alter Vida), Ministro de Defensa General Bareiro Spaini (hombre de la embajada norteamericana, educado en las escuelas de golpistas de Estados Unidos) o el ministro de Hacienda Dionisio Borda, antiguo responsable de las finanzas de los gobiernos corruptos y agente de la embajada norteamericana y del FMI.
Asimismo, Fernando Lugo ha anunciado que se mantendrá la política de sometimiento al imperio nortemericano en Paraguay, y se desconoce lo tratado por Lugo en New York con referentes de la mafia ítalo-norteamericana como John Tonelli, o con el heredero del imperio petrolero que en la década de 1930 llevó a la matanza a cien mil bolivianos y paraguayos, David Rockefeller. Lo único cierto es que ofició de guía turístico en la gran manzana Conrado Pappalardo, un personaje conocido por haber operado para el Plan Cóndor y haber proveído pasaportes para el asesinato en Washington de Orlando Letelier.

Otros cónclaves nunca aclarados por parte del obispo fueron sus reuniones con James Cason y Roger Noriega, pocos segundos después que Aleida Guevara March, hija del Che Guevara, haya abandonado la misma oficina por la misma puerta por la que entraron estos grandes amigos de Cuba y los hermanos Castro.
No se sabe el motivo de las visitas de Christopher McMuller, subsecretario norteamericano de Asuntos del Hemisferio Occidental, al viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores paraguayo, Jorge Lara Castro, un viejo favorecido de la embajada norteamericana de Asunción.


Todo el andamiaje de la CIA y sus extensiones y derivados, como USAID, la National Endowment for Democracy y la prensa adicta al imperio, se jugó por el obispo Fernando Lugo el 20 de abril.

En Paraguay, llamó la atención que las ONGs recibieran fuertes donaciones a partir de la llegada al país del embajador James Cason, un conocido desestabilizador apadrinado por Otto Reich. El objetivo de la operación encubierta era sufragar la alternancia en el poder, ubicando al obispo Fernando Lugo en la presidencia de Paraguay.

Entre las numerosas organizaciones beneficiarias de estos dólares distribuidos por la administración de George W. Bush que apoyaron a la campaña del obispo, sobresalieron Gestión Local y la Casa de la Juventud, que financiaron con fondos de USAID e IAF a los movimientos Tekojoja y Pmas, como en Nicaragua la NED y otros organismos alternativos de la CIA propiciaron la elección de Violeta Chamorro en 1989.

Las organizaciones no gubernamentales y voluntarias –lo que hoy conocemos por sociedad civil— son conocidas como una extensión de las políticas neoliberales de EE UU en todo el mundo.

La CIA y la US Agency for International Development (USAID ó AID) tienen un protagonismo central en el esquema de promover las ideas y hechos políticos favorables al imperio, y a ellas se añadió un nuevo organismo, creado en 1983, bautizado como The National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

En Paraguay, la NED ejerce un control total sobre la prensa mediática, a la que presenta listas indicando cuáles son los referentes políticos que puede promocionar. Son los principales referentes de la NED los propietarios de ABC color y radio Ñandutí, Aldo Zucolillo y Humberto Rubín, dueños de gran parte de lo que en el país se puede decir. En Brasil, a comienzos de los 60, se utilizaron idénticas operaciones de la CIA junto a las de la sociedad civil opuesta al gobierno, con el resultado de provocar el golpe militar de 1964 contra el presidente Joâo Goulart, que dio comienzo a 20 años de una represión política indescriptiblemente brutal.

En fechas más recientes coordinaron un golpe mediático contra el gobierno de Raúl Cubas en Paraguay (marzo de 1999) y aceitaron a la sociedad civil de oposición al gobierno venezolano de Hugo Chávez, donde el papel de organismos gubernamentales estadounidenses, la CIA y otros como la AID y la NED detrás del fallido golpe de estado de abril de 2002 fue evidente.

El embajador norteamericano James Cason, como un flautista de Hamelín dedicado a cantar folklore paraguayo, fue determinante para alinear a todas las ONGs y fundaciones que reciben dólares americanos detrás del clérigo-presidente, sobrino del agente de la CIA Epifanio Méndez (delatado por Agee) y que perpetúa hoy la tradición familiar.

Entre las organizaciones aparecieron incluso grupos de feministas, que se vieron obligadas a impulsar una candidatura de un obispo católico, a pesar del clásico antagonismo con el Vaticano.

Entre estas supuestas organizaciones civiles estuvieron las feministas de convicciones subsidiadas por USAID como las Mujeres Políticas en Red, Parlamento Mujer, Red de Mujeres Políticas, Red de Mujeres Munícipes del Paraguay (RMMP), Coordinadora Interpartidaria de Mujeres del Paraguay (CIMPAR),), Mujeres Políticas por la Democracia y el Desarrollo,etc.

Son sufragadas desde la embajada norteamericana además de las redes de mujeres, Ideco (Roberto Ferreira), el Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Partido Encuentro Nacional, Patria Querida, el grupo de adherentes del Partido Unace que lidera Emma Rolón, la Red de Contralorías ciudadanas del Paraguay, la Contraloría Ciudadana de Ypané, Afosci, CIDSEP, CISNI, Fedem, Transparencia Paraguay, Semillas para la Democracia, radio Los Angeles, Radio Comunitaria de Villa Elisa, Fundación Tierra Nueva y GEAM, todos estos grupos aglutinados en el Grupo impulsor para la Regulación del Financiamiento Político en Paraguay.

La nómina sigue con Sakã (transparencia, en guaraní), integrada por cinco organizaciones no gubernamentales, Gestión Local, vinculada al Moviendo Tekojoja. Los "proyectistas" son Raúl Monte Domecq y Guillermina Kanonnikoff).

Otros grupos paraguayos financiados por extensiones de la CIA son Decidamos, Instituto de Geopolítica y Estudios Internacionales (IPEGEI), Radio CARITAS, Mujeres Por la Democracia, Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociológicos Fundación Paraguaya para la Cooperación y Desarrollo, Centro de Estudios Democráticos (CED), Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo, Instituto de derecho y Economía Ambiental, Centro de Estudios y Formación para el Ecodesarrollo, Asociación de Empresarios, Comité Paraguay-Kansas, Asociación Afro Paraguaya Kamba Cua, Centro Interdisciplinario de Derecho Social y Economía Política, Fundación Arlequín Teatro", Casa de la Juventud – Paraguay, cuna del Pmas de Camilo Soares, Cooperativa La Norteña y la Escuela Agrícola de Carumbey, Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales y Sociales.

En el marco de la campaña pro-obispo, maletines de George W. Bush ingresaron en forma encubierta en Paraguay, yendo a parar a los bolsillos de los partidarios del obispo de los pobres y teólogo de la liberación, el marxista clérigo-presidente Fernando Lugo.

Por ejemplo, los 45,226.96 dólares que en nombre del Plan Umbral recibió recientemente la guevarista Casa de la Juventud (ONG que recauda para el PMas) de mano de organismos imperialistas bajo control de George W. Bush, supuestamente para enseñar a estudiantes secundarios algo fundamental: "identificar la corrupción" en Paraguay. Se suma el dinero a los 127.000 con que anteriormente les benefició la IAF. Se añaden en el mismo contexto las fuertes sumas que recibe Gestión Local, ONG cuyos responsables son a la vez financistas de Tekojoja, o los 132.700 dólares que en el 2006 recibió la Fundación Arlequín Tetro (refugio de organizadores de manifestaciones contra la actual administración municipal) para objetivos tan relacionados con el arte escénico como "ayudar a adolescentes de centros educativos a identificar, estudiar, discutir y atender las prioridades de la comunidad". Debemos agregar los 116.300 dólares de George W. Bush recibidos en el 2006 por el CIDSEP, los 95.000 dólares recibidos por la Fundación paraguaya para la Cooperación y Desarrollo del ex intendente Martín Burt, los 94.000 depositados a nombre de la ADEC, los 27.500 donados a la CPES de Domingo Rivarola, los 164.404 aportados a la CED, o las importantes donaciones que reciben el CIRD de Agustín Carrizosa para "apoyar a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil", la IDEA de Patricia Abed, o los sensibles ecologistas de Alter Vida como Jorge Lara Castro.

Como puede advertirse, la lista es bastante extensa y garantiza un amplio control sobre la "sociedad civil" paraguaya. No es la victoria electoral del Obispo Fernando Lugo la primera operación exitosa de la NED, USAID y la CIA en Paraguay, que ya actuó en Paraguay con eficacia varias veces. Por ejemplo, cuando en 1989 se derrumbaba la Unión Soviética, y con ella la propaganda con que el dictador Alfredo Stroessner justificaba sus abusos, se aseguró de promover un cambio a la medida de los intereses imperialistas, limpiando expedientes y ubicando en la presidencia a un célebre narcotraficante.

El mismo año el gobierno norteamericano invirtió mil millones de dólares en el triunfo de Violeta Chamorro en Nicaragua, imponiendo así una jefa de estado con los billetes provenientes de la National Endowment for Democracy, un inofensivo organismo llamado a tomar la posta de la CIA desde 1983.

Considerando inminente el fin de Stroessner, el imperio norteamericano se movilizó en ese entonces para impedir que sus adversarios tomen las riendas a su caída, para lo cual se apresuró a ganar para su causa a los disidentes con una muy buena remuneración.

El encargado de distribuír los dólares para "el cambio" fue el Dr. Carl Gershman, presidente de la NED. La Freedom House funcionó como un embudo por donde pasaron los fondos que concedía la NED, y gran parte de ellos fueron a parar a los bolsillos de los comunicadores destacados.

Radio Ñandutí, a través de la Casa de la Libertad, recibió importantes sumas de dinero de la National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Leonard Sussman, agente de la CIA y Director Ejecutivo de la Casa de la Libertad, realizó una visita a Paraguay a fines de 1987, guiado por Humberto Rubín, estableciendo contactos con varias organizaciones que luego recibirían fondos de la NED. El objetivo era "madurar" la idea del cambio.

A partir de entonces, estos organismos promovieron la estructuración de un andamiaje que hoy controla todo lo que en Paraguay se puede decir, paradójicamente con la coartada de que defienden la libertad de expresión.
Un organismo es la Cámara de Anunciantes del Paraguay (CAP), a la que acompaña Cerneco. Reciben con frecuencia los auspicios de USAID. Por ejemplo, el "Foro por la libertad de expresión", organizado por la Cámara de Anunciantes del Paraguay (CAP) y CERNECO en noviembre de 2004, fue auspiciada por la USAID (Agencia Internacional de desarrollo de los Estados Unidos). A este "Foro" asistió el señor Kevin Goldberg, "experto norteamericano en Libertad de Expresión y Derecho a la Información". Otro apéndice de la embajada norteamericana es el Centro de Regulación, Normas y Estudios de la Comunicación (CERNECO), fundado en 1990. Humberto Rubin, vinculado con la Nacional Endowment for Democracy (NED), fue presidente de CERNECO entre 1992-2002.
CERNECO proclama que "Surgió como un medio para canalizar inquietudes, ideales y el espíritu de servicio y progreso de un grupo de personas vinculadas al campo de la comunicación masiva".
Se formó una línea de acción que enfocaba el tema del Código de Ética, que regulaba la conducta de los propios medios de comunicación, de las empresas anunciantes y de las agencias de publicidad. Integraron la comisión pro-Código de Ética: Carlos Jorge Biedermann, Rufo Medina e Ilde Silvero. Rufo Medina e Ilde Silvero son empleados de Aldo Zuccolillo, dueño del diario ABC Color. En cuanto a Carlos Jorge Biedermann, basta con señalar que es yerno del general de la "Operación Cóndor", Guillermo Federico Clebsch, egresado de la Escuela de las Américas, detalle que alcanza para conocer cuál es la tendencia de su "ética"
Otra organización vinculada a este grupo es CONAR: Consejo de Autorregulación Publicitaria de CERNECO, un ente privado cuyo objetivo es la autorregulación de la publicidad, proponiendo a través de sus recomendaciones, que los mensajes publicitarios se encuadren dentro de los principios de la legalidad, honestidad, decencia y veracidad".

Toda esa estructura estuvo al servicio del Obispo Fernando Lugo, en una operación magistralmente coordinada por el desestabilizador estrella de George W. Bush, James Cason, y presentada ante la prensa mediática y los incautos como "un gran triunfo de la izquierda". Lo que se dice una perfecta operación encubierta de la CIA en Paraguay.